Administrative Law- Agency Press Release Allegedly Misinterpreting Statute Held Sufficiently Final for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief by Editors,
1963]
CASE COMMENTS
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW-AGENCY PREss RELASE ALLEGEDLY
MISINTERPRETING STATUTE HELD SUmIcNTLY FixAL FOR DE-
OLARATORY AND INJUNVCEirF RELIEF
As an indication of credit standing, banks insured by the Federal
Deposit Insurance Corporation often require borrowers to deposit twenty
percent of their debt in return for the banks' negotiable certificates of
deposit. At borrowers' request, plaintiff investment firm purchases these
certificates and then discounts them to investors.' The FDIC determined
that these transactions undercut the purpose of the deposits,2 and, to deter
investor purchase,3 asserted in a press release 4 that the certificates did not
represent insured deposits.5 The firm petitioned a federal district court "
for a declaratory judgment interpreting the statutory term "insured deposit"
and for an injunction restraining further FDIC assertions. The Court of
Appeals for the First Circuit reversed the district court dismissal, 7 found
a justiciable controversy, and remanded for a determination on the merits.
B. C. Morton Int'l Corp. v. Federal Deposit Ins. Corp., 305 F.2d 692
(1st Cir. 1962).
The issues presenting obstacles to a decision on the merits were the
standing of the petitioner and the finality of the press release.8  On the
1 Investment firms that make such deposits usually charge the bank cus-
tomer a fee of 6% of the funds furnished on his behalf . . . .The investment
firm then sells the certificate to a private investor, generally at a "discount".
That means the investor pays the securities firm slightly less than the face
amount of the certificate which the bank will redeem in full, plus interest.
This discount usually is figured to provide a return of 2%o a year on the
principal in addition to the 3% interest received from the bank.
Wall Street Journal, Nov. 14, 1960, p. 7, col. 2.
2 The agency considered borrowers who need help to meet the compensating
balance requirements bad credit risks. The Wall Street Journal headlined the report
of the release "Agency Acts To Discourage Plan That Gives Investors 5% on Insured
Bank Deposits." Ibid.
3Appellant maintained that "Due to the impression of 'official government action'
created in the public mind by the release, the demand for such certificates of deposit
by investors dropped off sharply and was in effect destroyed." Brief for Appellant, p. 5.
4 Wall Street Journal, Nov. 14, 1960, p. 7, col. 2.
5According to 74 Stat. 546 (1960), 12 U.S.C. § 1813(1) (Supp. III, 1962), "the
term 'deposit' means the unpaid balance of money or its equivalent received or held
by a bank in the usual course of business and .. .which is evidenced by its certificate
of deposit . . . ." 64 Stat. 875 (1950), 12 U.S.C. § 1813(m) (1958) defines the
term "insured deposit" as the "net amount due to any depositor for deposits . .. .
6Although 70 Stat. 138 (1956), 12 U.S.C. § 1848 (1958) allows appeal to a
Circuit Court by "any party aggrieved by an order of the Board under . . ." the
Banking Laws, appellant avoided dispute over the scope of the word "order" by an
action under 28 U.S.C. § 1331(a) "under the . . . laws . . .of the United States."
7B. C. Morton Int'l Corp. v. Federal Deposit Ins. Corp., 199 F. Supp. 702 (D.
Mass. 1961).
8 Other possible obstacles to judicial review of administrative acts are non-
exhaustion of administrative remedies, Myers v. Bethlehem Shipbuilding Corp., 303
U.S. 41, 50 (1938); FPC v. Union Producing Co., 230 F.2d 36 (D.C. Cir.), cert.
denied, 351 U.S. 927 (1956); Miles Laboratories v. FTC, 140 F.2d 683 (D.C. Cir.),
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question of standing, although the plaintiff was neither protected nor ac-
corded standing by the FDIC statute, it alleged that the FDIC press release
was an arbitrary act, directed specifically at it, which caused irreparable
injury. In remanding for consideration of the merits, the court of appeals
necessarily determined that the danger of arbitrary and malicious agency
action resulting in serious injury to the plaintiff outweighed the public
interest in permitting the agency to experiment to cure a misuse of banking
facilities.9
There is no clear test to determine the degree of finality 10 requisite
for review of administrative action. The courts balance several factors in-
cluding the form and purpose of the action and its effect on both regulated
and unregulated parties." When the agency explicitly punishes conduct
or compels action, as in the case of an adjudicative order, courts almost
cert. denied, 322 U.S. 752 (1944), and statutory preclusion of review, Heikkila v.
Barber, 345 U.S. 229 (1953).
When any threshold determination bars review, the court may neither decide the
question of law nor determine whether substantial evidence supports the administrative
findings. Davis, Nonreviewable Administrative Action, 96 U. PA. L. Rxv. 749 (1948).
See generally Davis, Unreviewable Administrative Action, 15 F.R.D. 411 (1954) ;
Davis, Nonreviewable Administrative Action, supra; Note, What Orders of an Ad-
ministrative Body Are Reviewable, 31 GEo. L.J. 40 (1942); ATTY. GEN. Comm. ON
ADmIiNISTRATIVE PROCEDURE, FINAL REPORT 84-90 (1941).
Justice Frankfurter stated that justiciability requirements often are more restric-
tive than the basic constitutional restriction of "case or controversy." Joint Anti-
Fascist Refugee Comm. v. McGrath, 341 U.S. 123, 151 (1951) (concurring opinion) ;
see Rochester Tel. Corp. v. United States, 307 U.S. 125, 131 (1939) ; Note, 62 COLUm.
L. REv. 106, 110 (1962); cf. Poe v. Ullman, 367 U.S. 497, 502-03 (1961).
9 See generally Jaffe, Standing To Secure Judicial Review: Private Actions, 75
HARv. L. REv. 255, 261-88 (1961) ; Note, Statutory Standing To Review Administrative
Action, 98 U. PA. L. REv. 70 (1949).
30 Davis refers to "finality" as a ripeness requirement although that term is found
more often in private law. See DAvIs, ADmINISTRATVE LAw TREATISE § 22.01, at
209 (1958). But while finality and ripeness both relate to conservation of judicial
energy, only finality demands consideration of administrative-judicial separation of
power.
11 The remedy demanded, whether it be declaratory judgment, injunction, or
mandatory relief, does not alter the court's definition of administrative finality. The
declaratory judgment is most often used, though, and it is generally coupled with an
injunctive demand. Carrow, Types of Judicial Relief From Administrative Action,
58 COLum. L. REv. 1, 17 (1958). Even though these are preliminary remedies and
precede coercive administrative action, the finality requirement is nevertheless strict.
Altvater v. Freeman, 319 U.S. 359, 363 (1943) ; cf. Aetna Life Ins. Co. v. Haworth,
300 U.S. 227, 239-41 (1937).
The Declaratory Judgment Act, 28 U.S.C. §§ 2201-02 (1958), does not expand
the definition of controversy. Aetna Life Ins. Co. v. Haworth, supra at 239-41.
The case cannot be hypothetical, Public Serv. Comm'n v. Wycoff Co., 344 U.S. 237,
242-43 (1952), the possible damage must not be too remote or speculative, see Public
Util. Comm'n v. United States, 355 U.S. 534, 538-539 (1958) ; International Longshore-
men's Union v. Boyd, 347 U.S. 222, 224 (1954) ; Public Serv. Comm'n v. Wycoff Co.,
supra at 245-46, adverse action by the opponent must be threatened, id. at 244; Aralac,
Inc. v. Hat Corp. of America, 166 F.2d 286, 292-93 (3d Cir. 1948) ; Rhodes Pharmacal
Co. v. Dolcin Corp., 91 F. Supp. 87, 88 (S.D.N.Y. 1950). See generally BORcHARD,
DECLARATORY JUDGMENTS 875-924 (2d ed. 1941); DAvIS, ADmINISTRATIVE LAW
TREATISE, §§ 23:04-05 (1958) ; Carrow, supra at 20-22.
Jaffe, supra note 9, at 255, 269, says that even though CBS v. United States, 316
U.S. 407 (1942), see text accompanying notes 20-23 infra, rested on the Federal
Communications Act's procedures for review, it influenced the common law of review-
ability of administrative action.
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invariably find sufficient finality for review.'2 In addition, when an agency
exercises its rulemaking power courts have granted review on a showing
of potential civil or criminal penalties,"3 or immediate 14 or future '5 injury.
But when the agency policy formulation is informally publicized by press
release ' 6 or bulletin,' 7 rather than by rule or regulation, the courts, even in
the face of highly adverse effect, generally do not find finality.'8 Courts
also are less inclined to review administrative actions that inhibit third
parties than they are to review actions that deter activities of regulated
parties.' 9
The Administrative Procedure Act, 60 Stat. 243 (1946), 5 U.S.C. § 1009(a)-(b)
(1958), has apparently not altered finality requirements. See Hearst Radio, Inc. v.
FCC, 167 F.2d 225, 227 (D.C. Cir. 1948); Davis, Nonreviewable Administrative
Action, 96 U. PA. L. Rxv. 749, 753-57 (1948); Developments in the Law-Declaratory
Judgments, 62 HAv. L. REV. 787, 878-80 (1949) ; Note, 104 U. PA. L. REv. 843, 861
(1956) ; Note, 98 U. PA. L. REv. 70, 71 n.136 (1949).
12 The Supreme Court found finality with this test in Public Util. Comm'n v.
United States, 355 U.S. 534, 538-39 (1958); United States v. Storer Broadcasting
Co., 351 U.S. 192, 199-200 (1956); Rochester Tel. Corp. v. United States, 307 U.S.
125, 144 (1939). It denied review using the same test in International Longshore-
men's Union v. Boyd, 347 U.S. 222, 223 (1954) ; Public Util. Comm'n v. United Air
Lines, 346 U.S. 402 (1953) ; Public Serv. Commn v. Wycoff Co., 344 U.S. 237, 245-46
(1952).
13 Frozen Food Express v. United States, 351 U.S. 40, 42 (1956). Criminal
penalties might be imposed in the instant case, for:
Whoever, except as expressly authorized by Federal law . . . represents
falsely by any device whatsoever that his . . . certificates . . . are insured
or guaranteed by the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation . . . shall be
punished by a fine . . . or imprisonment . . . . A violation of this section
may be enjoined at the suit of the United States Attorney, upon complaint
by any duly authorized representative of any department or agency of the
United States.
18 U.S.C. § 709 (1958).
14 CBS v. United States, 316 U.S. 407, 422-23 (1942).
I5 United States v. Storer Broadcasting Co., 351 U.S. 192, 199 (1956). However,
the adverse effect cannot be wholly contingent on future administrative action. Mag-
nolia Petroleum Co. v. FPC, 236 F.2d 785, 791-92 (5th Cir. 1956), cert. denied, 352
U.S. 968 (1957).
6 The Securities and Exchange Commission is statutorily authorized to use
publicity to enforce regulations. 48 Stat. 899 (1934), 15 U.S.C. § 78u(a) (1958).
The state fair employment practice commissions, the Federal Trade Commission, the
Federal Alcohol Commission, and the price control administrations also use publicity
for regulation. CHAmBmLAIN, DOWLING & HAYS, THE JUDIcIAL FUNCTION IN FEn-
ERAL ADmINISTRATIVE AGENCIES 111-121 (1942). See generally ATTY. GEN. Comm.
ON ADMINISTRATIVE PROcEDURE, FINAL REPORT 27; DAVIS, ADMINISTRATIvE LAW
TREATISE §§ 4:02-04, 21:08 (1958). Publicity by the Food and Drug Administration
often has had a greater deterrent effect than more direct penalties. Lee, Enforce-
ment Provisions of the Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act, 6 LAW & CONTEMP. PROB.
70, 90 (1939). The FCC uses many publicity-oriented methods of control such as
letters, magazines, speeches, dicta in its judicial determinations, and its own publi-
cations. Miller, Principles of Law Limiting Radio Broadcasting, 9 F.R.D. 217, 235
(1950).
17 See Standard Computing Scale Co. v. Farrell, 249 U.S. 571 (1919).1 8 E.g., Standard Computing Scale Co. v. Farrell, mtpra note 17; Kukatush
Mining Corp. v. SEC, 309 F.2d 647 (D.C. Cir. 1962) ; Hearst Radio, Inc. v. FCC,
167 F.2d 225 (D.C. Cir. 1948) ; Employers Group of Motor Freight Carriers, Inc. v.
National War Labor Bd., 143 F.2d 145 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 323 U.S. 735 (1944) ;
see CHAmB ILAIN, DOWLING & HAYS, op. cit. stpra note 16, at 119-20; Rouxz,
SECRECY & PUBLICrrY 150-60 (1961).
'9 Compare Eccles v. Peoples Bank, 333 U.S. 426 (1948), and Kukatush Mining
Corp. v. SEC, 309 F.2d 647 (D.C. Cir. 1962), and Hearst Radio, Inc. v. FCC, 167
F.2d 225 (D.C. Cir. 1948), with Frozen Food Express v. United States, 351 U.S. 40
(1956), and CBS v. United States, 316 U.S. 407 (1942), and Trans-Pacific Freight
Conference of Japan v. Federal Maritime Bd., 302 F.2d 875 (D.C. Cir. 1962).
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In CBS v. United States 20 the Supreme Court found sufficiently final
a Federal Communications Commission regulation which threatened to
penalize network affiliation by refusal to renew broadcast licenses. The
Court held that review was necessary "to protect [petitioner] from the
irreparable injury threatened . . . by . . . rulings which attach legal
consequences to action taken in advance of other hearings and adjudications
that may follow, the results of which the regulations purport to control." 
2
The present case resembles CBS since plaintiff there similarly attacked
agency action that deterred advantageous dealing and injured business
operations. Subsequent to CBS, however, courts have distinguished agency
control of parties clearly within the regulatory ambit from deterrence of
activity by investors who are not subject to the direct control of the
agency.22 In addition, courts do not apply the CBS rationale to agency
pronouncements that lack the formality of the regulation promulgated
there.2 3 In the present case, therefore, the court relied primarily on Joint
Anti-Fascist Refugee Comm. v. McGrath.2 4 The agency action in that
20 316 U.S. 407 (1942). CBS has been summarized as holding that "in certain
circumstances a rule can have such an immediate impact on those affected as to present
a justiciable issue and warrant injunctive relief." Carrow, supra note 11, at 18.
CBS has not been limited to cases under the Federal Communications Act. E.g.,
Frozen Food Express v. United States, 351 U.S. 40, 48 (1956); Stark v. Wickard,
321 U.S. 288, 303, 305 (1944); Continental Bank & Trust Co. v. Martin, 303 F.2d
214, 217 (D.C. Cir. 1962); Amerada Petroleum Corp. v. FPC, 285 F.2d 737, 739
(10th Cir. 1960).
21 CBS v. United States, 316 U.S. 407, 425 (1942). Justice Frankfurter char-
acterized the decision as stating
that the courts should reject the doctrine of administrative finality and take
jurisdiction whenever action of an administrative agency may seriously affect
substantial business interests, regardless of how intermediate or incomplete
that action may be ....
Id. at 446 (dissenting opinion).
2 See note 19 and accompanying text.
23 See, e.g., Eccles v. Peoples Bank, 333 U.S. 426 (1948), Hearst Radio, Inc. v.
FCC, 167 F.2d 225 (D.C. Cir. 1948); Hoxsey Cancer Clinic v. Folsom, 155 F. Supp.
376 (D.C. Cir. 1957).
24341 U.S. 123 (1951). Justices Burton, Black, and Frankfurter agreed that
administrative acts causing substantial and imminent harm to rights protected against
private action were justiciable. Id. at 140-41, 142, 159 (1951). However, Justice
Frankfurter's opinion distinguished as unreviewable situations in which, as in the
instant case, the invalid exercise of an admitted power was challenged. Id. at 160.
Justice Douglas called the injury real and immediate, but his criterion for review
did not look only to injury from adverse public opinion, but also to the penalties of
other regulatory agencies. He called the attorney general's listing a determination
of status. Id. at 175. Such a determination is not unlike a fully reviewable adjudi-
cation. See id. at 175. See also Hannah v. Larche, 363 U.S. 420, 452 (1960). In
the instant case neither adjudication nor unreviewable penalty of another agency
follows from publicity.
Justice Jackson expressed skepticism about review when the only harm to the
organization is public disapproval; he based justiciability on the injury to the
discharged government employee who is unable to attack the listing. Joint Anti-
Fascist Refugee Comm. v. McGrath, supra at 184-85. The damage in the instant
case, stemming solely from public opinion, lies within Justice Jackson's exception.
The three dissenters denied reviewability altogether, finding no sanction, order,
or punishment, but a mere abstract declaration by an administrator. Id. at 202.
100 U. PA. L. Rxv. 274-276 (1951) states that, as a result of Joint Anti-Fascist,
executive action or advice will no longer be immune from court review and that invalid
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case-listing of subversive organizations-was informal and directed at an
organization outside the agency's power, but the case is distinguishable
because, instead of commercial interests, it involved "preferred" first
amendment rights 2 which could be vindicated in no other manner.
2 6
The chief factor against review of informal agency action is judicial
reluctance to interfere with administrative operations before they culminate
in final policy articulation.2 7 Although informal hearings and communica-
tions usually precede final policy formulation, in many cases informal
agency action may occasion considerable injury to private parties 28 and
may in fact represent final action.2 9 The form, in itself, often gives little
indication of the finality of the agency action.30 Therefore, in many cases,
judicial review may be appropriate to relieve serious private injury.3 1
In the present case the court rejected spurious finality standards and
refused to be misled by the form of the agency action. Unfortunately, the
action by an administrative body which collaterally results in a destruction of the
future operation of any organization will be reviewable. But see Comment, Supreme
Court No-Clear-Majority Decisions: A Study in Stare Decisis, 24 U. CHI. L. Rxv.
99, 149, nn.250-51 (1956).
25 Cf. Davis, Nonreviewable Administrative Action, 96 U. PA. L. REv. 749, 792
(1948); see Rourke, Law Enforcement Through Publicity, 24 U. Cai. L. R.v. 225,
247 (1957) ; 20 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 294, 301 (1951).
26But see Bailey v. Richardson, 182 F.2d 46 (D.C. Cir. 1950), aff'd per curiam,
341 U.S. 918 (1951).
2 7 Public Serv. Comm'n v. Wycoff Co., 344 U.S. 237, 243 (1952).
2 8 See CrAiMoE.LAI N, DO _LING & HAYS, op. cit. supra note 16, at 111-12. See
also RotaxE, op. cit. supra note 18, at 113-17, 124-49. See generally Davis, Administra-
tlive Rules-Interpretative, Legislative and Retroactive, 57 YALE L.J. 919, 921-22 (1948).
Rourke recognizes the effective use of public opinion for punishment or sanction.
The state, then, only initiates punishment which damages private individuals without
resort to formal prosecution. The ability of government agencies to exert informal
pressure of this type is not curbed by restrictions on their capacity to inflict punish-
ment through regular legal channels. RouRx, op. cit. supra note 18, at 114-24.
Rourke considers as typical of this informal pressure the "cranberry scare" initiated
by the Agriculture Department in November, 1959 and Cutter vaccine publicity by
the Public Health Service in 1955. There is no record of attempted judicial relief
by cranberry growers but government indemnification followed. Id. at 124-30. See
generally, Hearings on Indemnity Payment to Growers of Cranberries and Caponettes,
Before a Subcommittee of the House Committee on Appropriations, 86th Cong., 2d
Sess. 5 (1960). Representative Whittan said the Agency "should first have seen
if the problem could not be met and the public health protected without having to
resort to a press release which we naturally know would affect the [whole market]
. " Id. at 15.
In Bantam Books Inc. v. Sullivan, 372 U.S. 58 (1963), the Court held that a
distributor who complied with an obscenity commission's letters labelling books ob-
jectionable acted involuntarily even though the commission could only threaten legal
sanction. The Court held it "naive to credit the state's assertion that these blacklists
are in the nature of mere legal advice, when they plainly serve as instruments of
regulation independent of the laws against obscenity." Id. at 68-69.
29 See Rouanz, op. cit. supra note 18, at 130-36. Even announcement of an im-
pending hearing may cause damage, but hearings are rarely enjoined. See Allen v.
Grand Cent. Aircraft Co., 347 U.S. 535 (1954); E. Griffith Hughes, Inc. v. FTC,
63 F.2d 362 (D.C. Cir. 1933).
30 See generally Rourke, supra note 25; Lee, supra note 16. In CBS v. United
States, 316 U.S. 407, 416 (1942), the Court called the FCC label of the report "not
necessarily conclusive."
31 See generally Roumxx, op. cit. supra note 18, at 238-42.
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court did not fully explain its test for finality. If the criteria for declaratory
relief in judicial review of agency action is identical to the standard ob-
served in litigation between private parties, judicial interference may occur
at an undesirably early stage of policy determination. The possibility of
such interference would upset the administrative process, encourage admin-
istrative secrecy, reduce administrative consultation with the public and
the regulated industry, and significantly deter preliminary warning of
anticipated administrative action. Probably for these reasons the CBS
holding has not been extrapolated to a "practical business consequence"
test.3 2 However, if formality in the agency pronouncement is required in
addition to a showing of injury as a prerequisite to review, many arbitrary
agency actions will not be reviewed. Therefore a finality standard which
focused on agency intention rather than the form of action 3 would be
more appropriate. Regardless of its method of announcement, when an
agency intends its action to be final and to influence conduct immediately,
courts should review that action if it causes harm that cannot be adequately
remedied by later review.
34
If policy statements through informal publicity result in irreparable
injury to regulated or third parties, and if formal and direct sanctions
accomplishing the same regulatory purpose would make the controversy
justiciable, the courts should find sufficient finality for review.3 5 In the
present case the content of the press release 36 and the clear FDIC interest
in regulating the deposit practice demonstrate the agency's intent to regu-
late. Short of actual refusal to indemnify holders of certificates of a bank
32 CBS v. United States, 316 U.S. 407, 438 (1942) (dissenting opinion); see
DAvIs, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TREATIsE § 30.01, at 191 (1958).
33 Miller, supra note 16, at 236 n.75, recommends that the concept of reviewable
agency action be expanded to include any administrative act including speech, report,
or opinion when the natural result is to cause persons to govern their conduct in
accordance with the action.
The opinion in the instant case indicates that the court would review an erroneous
press release aimed at a particular target, but not one intended to deter a generalized
type of activity. Instant case at 697. Since an action directed at specific individuals
is more coercive, this rationale seems to recognize "intent to control" as a deciding
factor. Yet, the cases cited as outside the reviewable category seem to be indistinguish-
able on that basis from the instant situations.
34 Dicta in Eccles v. Peoples Bank, 333 U.S. 426 (1948) seem to support such
a result. The Court said:
Where administrative intention is expressed but has not yet come to fruition
• . . or where that intention is unknown . . . we have held that the contro-
versy is not yet ripe for equitable intervention. Surely, when a body such
as the Federal Reserve Board has not only not asserted a challenged power
but has expressly disclaimed its intention to go beyond the legitimate "public
interest" confided to it, a court should stay its hand.
Id. at 434-35.
35 The general Anglo-American tradition of judicial review, in the absence of
explicit legislation to the contrary, outweighs any argument that implied legislative
intent bars attack on informal agency acts. Although review of informal means of
control would curtail agency experimentation with measures that might ultimately
prove to be valid, a party irreparably injured by the invalid experiment will be unable
to raise the issue at a later time.
36 Wall Street Journal, Nov. 14, 1960, p. 7, col. 2.
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which failed, no more definitive agency act seems possible.37 To require
more definitive action would probably preclude any challenge by plaintiff
since, by the time of FDIC refusal to indemnify, plaintiff would probably be
out of business.
ESTATE TAXATION-UxxERiOsED PowER To INVADE PRIN-
CIPAL FOR BEZNEFIT Or COMFORT HEi TAXABLE iN ESTATE OF
DECEASED DONEE AS A GENERAL PowER oF APPOINTMENT
In 1939 three sisters executed identical wills creating trusts of the
residues of their respective estates with income for life to the surviving
sister or sisters, the estate to be divided among certain relatives upon the
death of the last sister. The critical provision stated that because it was
their "desire that my sisters enjoy the benefit of my property to as full an
extent as they may require," a power to invade the principal is granted
if "in the sole judgment of the Trustees . . . it is at any time necessary
or advisable in order to provide for the reasonable needs and proper ex-
penses or the benefit or comfort of my sisters or the survivor of them."
Upon the death of the last surviving sister,' the Commissioner claimed that
her power to invade principal constituted a general power of appointment
rendering the value of the trusts taxable as part of her estate under section
2041(a) (2) of the Internal Revenue Code of 1954.2 Her executors paid
the estate tax assessed, but claimed that the power to invade 3 came within
3 7 Possible review of later adverse administrative action should not bar an earlier
determination of the issue by declaratory judgment. The questions before a court in
the later review and the earlier declaration will be identical. The requirement of
irreparable harm and intent to regulate insures that there is a present controversy.
I Only the last surviving sister could have had a power to invade that did not
fall under INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 2041(b) (1) (C) (ii) which states, "If the power
is not exercisable by the decedent except in conjunction with a person having a sub-
stantial interest in the property, subject to the power, which is adverse to the exercise
of the power in favor of the decedent-such power shall not be deemed a general
power of appointment." Treas. Reg. § 20.2041-3(c) (2), Example 1 (1958) indicates
that the life estates which the sisters had held in the trusts was such an interest.
2 (a) . . . The value of the gross estate shall include the value of all
property . . .
(2) . . . To the extent of any property with respect to which the
decedent has at the time of his death a general power of appointment
created after October 21, 1942 ....
(b) DEFmNTIoNs.-For purposes of subsection (a)-
(1) GENERAL POWER OF APPoINTMENT.-The term "general power
of appointment!' means a power which is exercisable in favor of the
decedent, his estate, his creditors, or the creditors of his estate; except
that-
(A) A power to consume, invade or appropriate property for
the benefit of a decedent which is limited by an ascertainable standard
relating to the health, education, support, or maintenance of the
decedent shall not be deemed a general power of appointment.
INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 2041.
3 Although the wills were written before unexercised powers were subject to
taxation, Congress provided a grace period of seven years in which wills could be
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the exception to section 2041(a) (2) for powers to consume, invade, or
appropriate that are limited by an "ascertainable standard relating to the
health, education, support or maintenance of the decedent." The court held
the trusts to be properly includible in the decedent's gross estate on the
ground that "benefit or comfort" as defined by Pennsylvania decisions is
not an "ascertainable standard" related to "support or maintenance."
Strite v. McGinnes, 215 F. Supp. 513 (E.D. Pa. 1963). 4
If the Treasury Regulations were alone determinative of the taxability
of unexercised powers to invade, no result other than the one reached by
the court would have been tenable, since the Regulations state that the term
"comfort" does not provide the requisite standard.5 However, the federal
criterion only becomes operative after the interest created by the language
of the instrument has been defined by state law." The court in the present
case had no controlling precedent to guide it, and therefore based its deci-
sion on Pennsylvania cases that construed "benefit" or "comfort" broadly
in other contexts 7 and on the language of the wills which indicated that the
sisters were the primary objects of bounty.
The court's decision will have harsh ramifications for testamentary
dispositions between spouses of property subject to comparable powers.
To qualify for the marital deduction,8 a "terminable interest" must be
"exercisable in all events" by the surviving spouse. The Court of Appeals
for the Third Circuit has already determined that the duty under Pennsyl-
revised. INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 2041(b) (3). For an argument that the legislation
is nonetheless harsh, see Freeman, If This Be Simplification-A View of Pre-1942
Powers of Appointment and the 1954 Internal Revenue Code Section 2041, 40 CoR-
NELL L.Q. 500, 507 (1955).
4 This case is currently on appeal to the Third Circuit. 2 Fm. EsT. & GInF TAX
REP. 1 12139 (1963).
5 Treas. Reg. § 20.2041-1(c) (2) (1958):
Powers limited by an ascertainable standard. A power to consume, invade,
or appropriate income or corpus, or both, for the benefit of the decedent
which is limited by an ascertainable standard relating to health, education,
support, or maintenance of the decedent is, by reason of Section 2041(b) (1)
(A), not a general power of appointment. A power is limited by such a
standard if the extent of the holder's duty to exercise and not to exercise the
power is reasonably measurable in terms of his needs for health, education,
or support (or any combination of them). As used in this subparagraph,
the words "support" and "maintenance" are synonomous and their meaning
is not limited to the bare necessities of life. A power to use property for the
comfort, welfare, or happiness of the holder of the power is not limited by
the requisite standard . .. ."
6 See Hoffman v. McGinnes, 277 F2d 598, 602 (3d Cir. 1966) ; Commissioner v.
Estate of Ellis, 252 F.2d 109, 113 (3d Cir. 1958) ; instant case at 515; Pittsfield Nat'l
Bank v. United States, 181 F. Supp. 851, 853 (D. Mass. 1960) ; Rev. Rul. 243, 1953-2
Cum. BULL. 267. See generally 2 MERTENS, FEDERAL. Gir AND ESTATE TAXATION
§ 19.08 (1959).
7 The cases cited by the court, instant case at 516, are Winthrop Co. v. Clinton,
196 Pa. 472, 477, 46 Atl. 435, 437 (1900), in which the issue was whether the testator
intended a spendthrift trust, and Zumbro v. Zumbro, 69 Pa. Super. 600, 604 (1918),
in which the definition of comfort was expanded to include the discharge of a moral
obligation.
8 LIFE ESTATE WITH POWER OF APPOINTMENT IN SURVIVING SPOUSE.-In
the case of an interest in property passing from the decedent, if his surviving
spouse is entitled for life to all the income from the entire interest, or all the
income from a specific portion thereof, payable annually or at more frequent
intervals, with power in the surviving spouse to appoint the entire interest or
such specific portion (exercisable in favor of such surviving spouse, or of
CASE COMMENTS
vania trust law to exercise a power in "good faith" 9 so limited a power
broader than the one in the present case that it was not "exercisable in all
events," and therefore not qualified for the marital deduction.10 However,
in the present case the court held that the same "good faith" standard did
not confine the decedent's power within the "ascertainable standard."
Even though the present case does not involve a conjugal relationship, it
raises the issue of whether the "exercisable in all events" test of the marital
deduction should be equated by means of statutory interpretation with the
"ascertainable standard" exception to section 2041 (a) (2) to avoid exposing
a trust devised to a spouse to the possibility of double taxation. It seems
paradoxical that a power to invade is in one case not sufficiently broad to
qualify the corpus for the marital deduction, but the same, or a more limited,
power may be deemed to give the holder enough control to warrant
taxability in her gross estate."
The court refused to strain the few state cases at its disposal to avoid
a precedent which might lead to double taxation in some future case. In
the estate of such surviving spouse, or in favor of either, whether or not in
each case the power is exercisable in favor of others), and with no power
in any other person to appoint any part of the interest, or such specific portion,
to any person other than the surviving spouse-
(A) the interest or such portion thereof so passing shall, for pur-
poses of subsection (a) [the marital deduction], be considered as passing
to the surviving spouse ....
This paragraph shall apply only if such power in the surviving spouse to
appoint the entire interest, or such specific portion thereof, whether exer-
cisable by will or during life, is exercisable by such spouse alone and in all
events.
INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 2056(b) (5). (Emphasis added.)
9 This obligation is automatically implied. See Commissioner v. Estate of Ellis,
252 F.2d 109, 113 (3d Cir. 1958) ; instant case at 518.
10 Commissioner v. Estate of Ellis, supra note 9, at 113 (will giving wife power
to invade corpus if she should so "require," "she and she alone to be the [sole] judge
of how much shall be required . . ."). Other cases applying the "exercisable in
all events" exception to the "terminable interest rule" have held powers much broader
in terms than the one in the present case to be too limited to qualify for the deduc-
tion. See Piatt v. Gray, 2 FED. EsT. & GmFT TAX RE'. 12160 (6th Cir. July 8,
1963) (power to expend or otherwise dispose of all personal property) ; United States
v. Lincoln Rochester Trust Co., 297 F.2d 891 (2d Cir. 1962) (life estate and the use
of any part of the principal of the estate) ; Estate of May v. Commissioner, 283 F.2d
853 (2d Cir. 1960) ("comfort, happiness, and well-being"); Commissioner v. Estate
of Ellis, 252 F.2d 109 (3d Cir. 1958) (if wife "requires"); Estate of Pipe v. Com-
missioner, 241 F.2d 210 (2d Cir. 1957) ("full power to use, enjoy, sell or dispose of
the income and principal thereof . . . for such purposes or in such manner, as she
in her uncontrolled discretion may choose") ; Matteson v. United States, 147 F. Supp.
535 (N.D.N.Y. 1956) ("so much . . . as she shall desire") ; Estate of Field, 2 FED.
EST. & GIn TAX REP. 118671 (T.C. Aug. 2, 1963) ("to consume my entire estate
for any purpose which she shall deem advisable').
11 In several marital deduction cases it has been contended that the two standards
should be read together in order to avoid taxation first in the estate of the husband
and then in the estate of the wife. See Estate of May v. Commissioner, 283 F.2d 853,
856 (2d Cir. 1960); Commissioner v. Estate of Ellis, 252 F.2d 109, 114 (3d Cir.
1958) ; Estate of Pipe v. Commissioner, 241 F.2d 210, 214 (2d Cir. 1957) ; Starrett
v. Commissioner, 223 F.2d 163, 166 (1st Cir. 1955). This argument is supported by
the committee report accompanying section 2056. S. REP. No. 1013, 80th Cong., 2d
Sess. (1948), 1948-1 Cum. BuLL. 285, 342: "This provision is designed to allow the
marital deduction for such cases where the value of the property over which the
surviving spouse has a power of appointment will (if not consumed) be subject to
either the estate tax or the gift tax in the case of such surviving spouse." The argu-
ment has been rejected in all the above cited cases in favor of a strict interpretation
of the "exercisable in all events" standard.
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two of the four federal cases so far applying the "ascertainable standard"
exception, the courts held a power nontaxable by using state law to place an
unreasonably narrow construction on the language of the instrument.1
2
Similarly, the present court could have avoided taxability by interpreting
"benefit or comfort" as restricted by the instrument's words "to as full an
extent as they may require," 18 and then further interpreting "require" to
mean need. 14 The court might have seized upon the words used in the
grant of power, such as "reasonable, .... advisable, .... necessary," and
"proper," 15 as somehow manifesting the testatrix' desire to avoid ex-
travagance and to protect the interests of the remaindermen.1' Further-
more, since the Regulations state that the requisite standard is not limited
to the necessities of life and extends to the mode of living to which the
beneficiary is accustomed, 17 the court also had some leeway in applying the
terms "support or maintenance." 18
Until now there has been no case holding a power to invade taxable in
the estate of the donee, which power would not also appear broad enough
1
2 Phinney v. Kay, 275 F.2d 776 (5th Cir. 1960) ; Snyder v. United States, 203
F. Supp. 195 (W.D. Ky. 1962); Pittsfield Nat'l Bank v. United States, 181 F. Supp.
851 (D. Mass. 1960) ; Barritt v. Tomlinson, 129 F. Supp. 642 (S.D. Fla. 1955). In
Pittsfield, the will devised a life estate "together with all or any such part of principal
of same as he may from time to time request, he to be the sole judge of his needs."
The court held that "request" must be read as being qualified by "needs"-which
being limited to the means of subsistence is narrower than support. In Barritt, the
life beneficiary was granted the power to "use all or any part of principal as she may
see fit," with remainder to the children. In light of the bequest of the remainders,
the court determined that the testators only intended to "supplement her support and
maintenance in so far as she deemed it necessary." This was held an ascertainable
standard. The court also stated that local law would limit such broad powers as
devised in the will to support and maintenance. Id. at 645.
13 Instant case at 514.
14 If "requires" can be related to "needs," Funk v. Commissioner, 185 F.2d 127
(3d Cir. 1950), has defined "needs" according to New Jersey law as that which is
necessary to maintain the beneficiary's station in life. See also United States v.
DeBonchamps, 278 F.2d 127, 130 (9th Cir. 1960) ; Clement v. Smith, 167 F. Supp.
369 (E.D. Pa. 1958) ; Smither v. United States, 108 F. Supp. 772 (S.D. Tex. 1952),
aff'd, 205 F.2d 518 (5th Cir. 1953).
15 Instant case at 517.
16 There are several Pennsylvania cases which have interpreted a testator's intent
to limit, to support or less, powers created by broad language. Trout v. Rominger,
198 Pa. 91 (1901) ("for her own use, benefit, and behoof forever; the same to be
and remain for her just and necessary support"; held that "benefit" was limited by
"just and necessary support") ; Gross v. Strominger, 178 Pa. 64, 70 (1896) (dictum)
(donee possessed a power to consume for "personal wants and comfort"; the court
stated, "Whatever was necessary for her support he intended she should have.");
Ziegler's Estate, 61 Montg. Co. L. Rptr. 207, 208 (Pa. Orphans' Ct. 1945) ("desire"
interpreted as "needs") ; Estate of Styer, 22 Montg. Co. L. Rptr. 45 (Pa. Orphans'
Ct 1906) ("use and enjoy" held not to create a power to consume because of fixed
remainders and absence of words such as "if anything remains" in the bequest to the
remaindermen).
17 Treas. Reg. § 20.2041- (c) (2) (1958).
18 The cases cited by the District Court did not necessarily preclude it from such
a holding, since they were concerned with different problems. Newton Trust Co. v.
Commissioner, 160 F.2d 175 (1st Cir. 1947), concerned the deductibility of a chari-
table gift in trust from gross income, in which case the amount of the gift must have
a presently ascertainable value measurable in monetary terms, so that the value of
the power reserved can be calculated. Helvering v. Evans, 126 F.2d 270, 271 nn.1-2
(3d Cir. 1942), involved taxability of accumulated trust income, which is dependent
upon whether any income is, or in the discretion of the grantor may be held or ac-
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to qualify the trust for the marital deduction.19 Whether the two standards
should be equated depends on the policy reasons underlying each provision.
Since the purpose of the marital deduction is to equalize the tax position of
married couples in common law states with those in community property
states,20 in which the property is automatically divided between spouses
by operation of law, the marital deduction depends on whether an interest
devised to a spouse is qualitatively equivalent to the fee interest of a spouse
in community property. This requirement results in the narrow limits of
the "exercisable in all events" test. If the surviving spouse cannot dispose
of the property at any time and in any manner during his life, it is the legis-
lative determination that the power so held does not give the spouse an
equivalent interest.
On the other hand, Congress extended the estate tax to unexercised
powers of appointment on the theory that a donee's failure to exercise the
power during his lifetime was in substance an exercise in favor of the
takers in default of appointment.2 ' It was also thought that a power to
consume or invade principal should be taxed as a general power of
appointment, even though not classified as one in the technical property
sense, since, as in the case of a power to appoint, a decision of the life
tenant determines whether the property will pass to the designated re-
mainderman. 22  The 1942 Revenue Act was the first to tax unexercised
powers, and included any power to invade, however limited.a It is reason-
able, therefore, to assume that the introduction of the "ascertainable stand-
ard" exception by the Powers of Appointment Act of 1951 was an attempt
more accurately to equate taxation with actual control over the property.24
Congress determined that when the power is limited within the exception,
the donee of the power does not have sufficient discretion as to its exercise
to control the destination of the property. 25
mumulated for future distribution to the grantor. "The controlling statutory con-
sideration is the existence of the described discretion .... " Id. at 273. As to
state cases cited, see note 7 supra.
19 See Phinney v. Kay, 275 F.2d 776 (5th Cir. 1960) ("to be used, occupied,
enjoyed, conveyed and expended by, and during the life of such survivor as such sur-
vivor shall desire"); Snyder v. United States, 203 F. Supp. 195 (W.D. Ky. 1962)
("power of disposition over both the principal thereof and income received therefrom,
in such manner as she may see fit!').
20 S. RE'. No. 1013, 80th Cong., 2d Sess. (1948). See Commissioner v. Estate
of Ellis, 252 F.2d 109, 112, 114 (3d Cir. 1958) ; Note, 107 U. PA. L. Ray. 1176 (1958) ;
Anderson, The Marital Deduction and Equalization Under the Federal Estate and
Gift Taxes Between Common, Law and Community Property States, 54 MicH. L. REv.
1087 (1956); Surrey, Federal Taxation of the Family-The Revenue Act of 1948,
61 Hxv. L. REv. 1097 (1948) ; Sugarman, Estate and Gift Tax Equalization--The
Marital Deduction, 36 CAszx. L. Ray. 223 (1948) ; 3 MERTENS, op. cit. supra note 6,
§ 29.01.
21 See Freeman, supra note 3, at 502-03; Craven, Powers of Appointment Act
of 1951, 65 HAav. L. REv. 55 (1951) ; Eisenstein, Powers of Appointment and Estate
Taxes (pts. 1-2), 52 YALE L.J. 296, 302, 494, 496, 521-24 (1943) ; Griswold, Powers
of Appointment and the Federal Estate Tax, 52 HARv. L. Rxv. 929, 952 (1939).
22 See Eisenstein, supra note 21, at 521-22 (1943).
23 INT. Ray. Acr or 1942, ch. 619, § 403, 56 Stat. 942, included as a general power
any retention of the possession or enjoyment of, or income from the property.
24 See 2 MERTENS, op. cit. supra note 6, § 19.14, at 549 n.12
25 A possible manifestation of this congressional determination is the exception
to the usual rules as to responsibility for estate tax found in INT. REv. CODE OF 1954,
1963]
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Since these two standards were formulated to cope with independent
and unrelated problems, courts should not read them together. Further-
more, it is clear, given the reasons for the tax under section 2041, that the
estate tax was intended to encompass powers allowing the holder discretion
similar to that in the present case. It is unlikely that Congress intended
that vague tests of accountability could liberate such powers from the
tax.26  However, uncovering the basis of the enacted statutory provisions
does not identify the enacted with the desirable. Congress should extend
the marital deduction to all powers which will be taxed in the surviving
spouse's estate. This would conform to the Senate committee reports
stating this to be a purpose of the present law.2 7 It would also further the
policy of equalization with the community property states, since in those
states taxation in the estates of both spouses of that half of the property
automatically vested in the surviving spouse cannot arise, their interests
being fixed by law.28
The present case indicates that the "ascertainable standard" test of
section 2041(b) (1) (A) is complex in application and subject to the
vagaries of indefinite local precedents.-9 It has caused uncertainty to the
estate planner and will drafter 3° Since the suggested legislation would
§2207, which makes the remainderman, not the executor of the estate, ultimately
responsible for such portion of the estate tax paid as the sum of such § 2041 property
bears to the total taxable estate. This provision was probably the result of a desire
not to penalize the rest of the estate for a bounty exclusively to the remainderman
which, although stemming from the donee of the power because of nonexercise thereof,
might have given the donee less than a full power of enjoyment during his life.
26 The Powers of Appointment Act of 1951 as originally introduced provided that
if the donee of the power is legally accountable for the exercise of the power, it is
not deemed a general power. Though this provision was eliminated because of
objections that it would create a tax-free power where the donee could exercise it
in his own favor, the committee reports contain identical language but with a further
caveat that "a power which is exercisable in favor of the holder, his estate, his
creditors or the creditors of his estate, is not regarded as a power for which the
holder is legally accountable." Craven, Powers of Appointment Act of 1951, 65
HARv. L. Ray. 55, 71 (1952). In Pennsylvania there is no case which has limited
a donee's power to consume for benefit or comfort.
27 S. RE. No. 1013, 80th Cong., 2d Sess. (1948), 1948-1 Cum. BuLL. 285, 342.
See note 23 supra.
28 Anderson, supra note 20, at 1114 (1956). The proposed legislation will not
necessarily discriminate against spouses in community property states who seemingly
cannot establish life estates in property which the spouse already owns by law in
fee simple, since there is a method in such states to effect this kind of property interest
by giving the surviving spouse an election to give up the fee in her half in favor of
a life estate in the whole. See Anderson, supra at 1102-1104.
29 Both this provision and the marital deduction of property subject to powers
of appointment have been criticized as being hard to apply, imprecise, and incompre-
hensible to the lawyer. See Freeman, supra note 3, at 507; Buck, Craven & Shackel-
ford, Treatment of Powers of Appointment for Estate and Gift Tax Purposes, 34
VA. L. Ray. 255, 277 (1948) ; Surrey, supra note 20, at 1117; Sugarman, supra note 20.
3O See BARTON, ESTATE PLANNING UNDER THE 1954 CODE § 16.11, at 267 (1959)
("There is always the possibility that a court may hold that a standard relating to
health, education, maintenance or support of the donee is too uncertain to come within
the exception . . . [so that] it should always be limited to a specified amount of
money per month or year."); Allen, Powers of Appointment and the Drafting of
Missouri Wills, 1954 WAsH. U.L.Q. 408, 419 (even when the draftsman thinks he
has an ascertainable standard, the best policy is to give the trustees and not the
beneficiary the sole right of encroachment until court decisions throw more light upon
the subject).
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make the marital deduction of property subject to a power to consume
depend upon taxability in the spouse's estate, the clarity of both provisions
will depend upon the precision and comprehensibility of the standard for
the latter. However, it is difficult to conceive of a standard which will
precisely measure the extent to which property comes to a remainderman
as a result of the nonexercise of a doneee's authorized discretion. One
approach might be to tax the entire corpus in the estate of the donee unless
the unexercised general power is measurable in monetary terms, in which
case only that amount would be taxed. A similar test is now used to
measure the extent of deductibility of a charitable bequest reserving a
power to invade in a private individual. 3' This latter test has been litigated
frequently, so that results are reasonably predictable.32  This approach
would also bring greater consistency to the policy of section 2041 by in-
cluding in the gross estate that part of a trust corpus that could have been
invaded by the exercise of limited and measurable powers. The decision
not to exercise a power to invade for support, to the extent that the power
could have been exercised, is as much a bounty to the remainderman from
the donee of the power as a decision not to exercise an unlimited power.as
However, until Congress decides to make the needed adjustments, courts
must continue to apply the enacted provisions with integrity.
31 See Treas. Reg. § 20.2055-2 (1958) ; 3 MERTENS, op. cit. supra note 6, § 28.38
(1959).
32 See cases cited 3 MERT.Ns, op. cit. supra note 6, §§ 28.38-.40. The use of this
standard is not a panacea, since it too has been criticized for vagueness. Freeman,
supra note 3, at 507. However, the Supreme Court has decided cases in this area,
see instant case at 518-19, and there is no dependence upon state standards, so there
can be uniformity in all states. If this were the § 2041 test, the instant case would
have been clearly in accord with the Supreme Court cases, supra, which the court
cited for persuasive authority.
When the Powers of Appointment Act of 1951 was passed, the regulations stated
that whether a power was limited by the requisite standard was to be determined
"by applying the principles followed in ascertaining the extent to which, if any, a
bequest of a trust for both private and charitable purposes is allowable as a deduction
under section 812(d) (now section 2055)." This was deleted, without explanation,
from the 1954 Regulations. Turk, The New Regulations on Powers of Appointment,
93 TRuSTS & ESTATES 752, 754 (1954).
33 Under this proposal, a limited power would be valued at the time of the donee's
death as determined by the number of years in which he was the holder of the power.
If the same power has already been valued at the time of the donor's death for pur-
poses of the marital deduction, with the help of actuarial tables, this determination
would be binding for taxation of the surviving spouse's estate to assure that only that
part so far untaxed will be then taxed, in accord with the policy of integrating §§ 2041
and 2056. Although there are as yet no decisions so indicating, it is possible that a
measurable standard attached to a power could render it subject to estate and gift
taxes under present laws. A power to invade for support which has lapsed, due to
nonexercise, could be considered a taxable gift from the donee to the remainderman.
The amount of principal that was available to the donee at his death, according to
the measurable standard, may be considered an interest in property in the estate of
the donee under § 2033. These tax consequences are not precluded by pre-§ 2042
cases holding powers of appointment nontaxable under § 2033 and its predecessor,
Revenue Act of 1916, ch. 463, § 202(a), 39 Stat. 777. See Helvering v. Safe Deposit
& Trust Co., 316 U.S. 56 (1942) (testamentary power to appoint) ; United States v.
Field, 255 U.S. 257 (1921) (same); Estate of Royce v. Commissioner, 46 B.T.A.
1090 (1942) (unlimited, and therefore not objectively measurable, power to con-
sume). In none of these cases was a measurable interest in principal ever vested in
the donee of the power to the extent that he could have exercised it.
19631
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FEDERAL COUIRTS-ALAAMA SUPREME COURT AFFIRms
DECREE OusTING NAACP FROM STATE WITHOUT REACHING
MERITS
The state of Alabama sought an injunction against the National Asso-
ciation for the Advancement of Colored People, claiming that it had failed
to comply with the Alabama foreign corporation registration law. The trial
court permanently enjoined the NAACP from conducting any intrastate
business in Alabama. The Supreme Court of Alabama affirmed, holding
on its own motion 1 that the NAACP's brief violated the court's procedural
requirement 2 that when unrelated assignments of error are argued together
and one assignment is without merit, the others will not be considered. The
court found at least one assignment of error without merit in each sub-
section of appellant's brief. The court then affirmed the decree without
considering the merits of any of the other assignments. NAACP v.
Alabama, 274 Ala. 544, 150 So. 2d 677 (1963), cert. granted, 32 U.S.L.
WEEx 3137 (U.S. Oct. 15, 1963) (No. 169).
It is well established that a state court may refuse to consider a federal
claim if the appellant violates reasonable and clearly articulated state rules
of procedure 3 However, when such refusal is grounded upon a substantive
or procedural holding that is "without any fair or substantial support" 4 in
state precedent, the Supreme Court of the United States may assume
jurisdiction.5
The Alabama court cited six cases to support its procedural holding
in the present case,6 but in only two of them did the court's reliance on
the rule preclude it from reaching the merits.7 In one case the court
refused to consider certain assignments of error because appellant had used
the same argument for all of his assignments, and one of the assignments
was without merit." In the other case the court applied its rule to a brief
1 Counsel for the state argued only the substantive issues, both in the brief and
on oral argument Petition for Certiorari, p. 12, instant case.
2 This requirement was derived from the following court rule: "Appellant's
brief under separate headings shall contain . . . argument with respect to errors
assigned which counsel desire to insist upon. Assignments of error not substantially
argued in brief will be deemed waived and will not be considered by the court."
ALA. Sup. CT. R. 9(d).
3 See, e.g., Parker v. Illinois, 333 U.S. 571 (1948).
4 Ward v. Board of County Comm'rs, 253 U.S. 17, 22 (1920).
5 See Wright v. Georgia, 373 U.S. 284 (1963) ; NAACP v. Alabama, 357 U.S.
449 (1958); Staub v. City of Baxley, 355 U.S. 313 (1958); Williams v. Georgia,
349 U.S. 375 (1955) ; Brinkeroff-Farris Trust & Say. Co. v. Hill, 281 U.S. 673 (1930).
6 Mize v. Mize, 273 Ala. 369, 141 So. 2d 200 (1962) ; Pak-A-Sak, Inc. v. Lauten,
271 Ala. 276, 123 So. 2d 122 (1960) ; McElhaney v. Singleton, 270 Ala. 162, 117 So.
2d 375 (1960) ; Shelby County v. Baker, 269 Ala. 111, 110 So. 2d 896 (1959); Thomp-
son v. Alabama, 267 Ala. 22, 99 So. 2d 198 (1957) ; Ford v. Bradford, 218 Ala. 62,
117 So. 429 (1928).
7 Pak-A-Sak, Inc. v. Lauten, .upra note 6; McElhaney v. Singleton, mpra note 6.
s Ibid.
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which apparently contained only one argument and referred to none of the
assignments of error in the argument section. 9 Since appellant's brief in
the present case '0 contained separate arguments for most of the assign-
ments of error and made explicit reference in the argument section to the
various assignments, the facts of the prior Alabama cases do not compel
the present holding. Moreover, the precedents reveal no precise explana-
tion of the procedural requirement. In Jefferson Standard Life Ins. Co. v.
Wigley," a case not mentioned in the present opinion, the court stated only
that the rule was not violated when appellant listed his assignments of error
in separate paragraphs, because the assignments were separate rather
than joint.'2 Appellant's brief in the present case seems to meet the
standard set by this terse, ambiguous holding.
In Wright v. Georgia,'3 the United States Supreme Court reversed
a conviction for disturbing the peace and held inadequate the procedural
rule relied upon by the Georgia Supreme Court to deny petitioner a new
trial without reaching the merits of his constitutional claim. The Georgia
court applied a rule that assignments of error not argued in appellant's
brief are deemed to be waived. The United States Supreme Court, how-
ever, after examining the brief filed by appellant in the Georgia court and
the state precedents, held that the requirement, although an interpretation
of an established rule, was so novel that petitioner was not afforded ade-
quate notice.14 Like Wright, the present case concerns a new application
of a state procedural requirement.
In Williams v. Georgia 15 the United States Supreme Court vacated
and remanded a conviction of first degree murder after the Georgia Supreme
Court had refused to consider a constitutional claim that Negroes had been
systematically excluded from the jury. Petitioner's claim had not been
considered because he had violated a state procedural requirement that all
challenges to the jury be made at trial. The United States Supreme
Court found that the state supreme court had reversed decisions denying
new trials in similar situations' 0 and held that state discretionary pro-
) Pak-A-Sak, Inc. v. Lauten, 271 Ala. 276, 279, 123 So. 2d 122, 125 (1960).
10 Appellant's brief is reproduced in its Petition for Certiorari, Appendix B,
pp. 30a-43a.
"248 Ala. 676, 29 So. 2d 218 (1947).
12The Alabama court said, "then follow nine assignments of error each made
in a separate paragraph. We consider that the assignments of error were severally
and separately made."
13 373 U.S. 284 (1963).
14 The Court felt that Georgia's interpretation of its rule in the Wright case
required appellant to make explicit reference to each assignment of error at the point
in the brief where that assignment was argued. Such a requirement had never before
been articulated. Id. at 290-91; cf. NAACP v. Alabama, 357 U.S. 449 (1958).
15 349 U.S. 375 (1955).
16 It had been argued that the Williams case is distinguishable from previous
Georgia decisions because it involved a challenge to an entire panel, while the other
cases involved challenges to a single juror. See The Supreme Court, 1954 Term,
69 HARv. L. REv. 119, 158 (1955). The Court, however, considered this distinction
meaningless. 349 U.S. at 387-88 (Frankfurter, J.).
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cedural requirements cannot be used to avoid a hearing on the merits of
appellant's constitutional claims. The court declared that, "a state court
may not, in the exercise of its discretion, decline to entertain a constitu-
tional claim while passing upon kindred issues raised in the same man-
ner." -1 Since the present court has four times previously considered the
merits of appellants' claims after determining that his brief violated the
procedural rule,15 the rule has apparently been applied in a discretionary
fashion.'2
Ample precedent exists, therefore, to justify Supreme Court review
of the NAACP's constitutional claims. On the merits, the action of the
NAACP's legal staff in securing representation for parties whose constitu-
tional rights may have been infringed is a mode of expression and asso-
ciation within the scope of the first amendment.20 Application of the first
amendment in any given case depends upon balancing the Government's
interest in limiting freedom of speech against the severity of the restric-
tion.2 ' In Bates v. Little Rock,22 the Supreme Court held that the state
interest did not justify forcing the NAACP to comply with a provision
of a municipal license tax ordinance which called for the production of the
local chapter's membership lists. The private interests involved in the
present case are even stronger than those in Bates, since the Alabama
court has enjoined all of the NAACP's activities within the state. On the
other hand, the state interest in enforcing its foreign corporation registra-
tion law is much weaker, since the state has refused the NAACP's offer
to comply with the registration act's requirements.2 3  The decree ousting
the NAACP from Alabama seems, therefore, to violate its right to freedom
of speech and association.
The procedural history of the present case indicates a deliberate
attempt on the part of the Alabama courts to evade a decision on the
17 Williams v. Georgia, supra note 15, at 383.
18 Mize v. Mize, 273 Ala. 369, 141 So. 2d 200 (1962) ; Shelby County v. Baker,
269 Ala. 111, 110 So. 2d 896 (1959); Thompson v. Alabama, 267 Ala. 22, 99 So. 2d
198 (1957) ; Ford v. Bradford, 218 Ala. 62, 117 So. 429 (1928).
19 The Alabama court has exercised its discretion in similar cases. In Thompson
v. Alabama, supra note 18, the state was seeking a permanent injunction to restrain
appellant from conducting his business. The Alabama court said that its rule was
applicable, but then went on to consider the merits of appellant's claims. The most
important considerations in determining whether to apply the rule strictly should be
the significance of the question of law presented or the constitutional violation claimed
and the degree of compliance with the procedural requirement. The significance of
the constitutional issues raised by the NAACP's appeal is unquestioned, and its brief
shows an attempt to comply substantially with the court rules.
20 NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415 (1963); Bates v. Little Rock, 361 U.S. 516
(1960).
21 Ibid.; NAACP v. Alabama, 357 U.S. 449 (1958).
22 361 U.S. 516 (1960).
23 See NAACP v. Alabama, 357 U.S. 449, 453 (1958). The decree issued by
the Alabama circuit court also enjoined the NAACP from taking any steps to comply
with the statute. This decree is reproduced in Appendix C of the NAACP's Petition
for Certiorari.
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NAACP's constitutional claims, in an effort seemingly designed to thwart
Supreme Court review of the substantive issues.2 The deprivation of
liberty caused by the present holding indicates that these efforts are not
likely to succeed.
INSURANOE-NoxsoHEDULED CARRIERt ExcLusioN I SnWGiEE-
FLIGHT LIFE PoLIcY HED AMBIGUOUS AS APPLIED TO SUBSTITUTED
Am TAXI WHEN INSURED CoULD NOT READ POLICY BEFORE
PUIRCHASE
A life insurance policy, purchased from the defendant's airport vend-
ing machine,' covered the insured's round trip flight, but excluded non-
scheduled carriers from coverage.2  The insured had no opportunity to
examine a copy of the policy before he put his money in the machine and
it was unclear whether he had any notice of the exclusion. When his
regular plane was grounded he arranged, with the help of an agent of the
regular carrier, for an independent air taxi plane, operated without a
24 In an earlier stage of the present litigation the Alabama Supreme Court denied
certiorari to review a contempt order, holding that mandamus was the proper remedy.
The United States Supreme Court examined the Alabama precedents and found that
mandamus was a proper but not an exclusive remedy. The Court unanimously re-
versed the contempt order, saying, "Novelty in procedural requirements cannot be
permitted to thwart review in this Court applied for by those who, in justified reliance
upon prior decisions, seek vindication in state courts of their federal constitutional
rights." NAACP v. Alabama, 357 U.S. 449, 457-58 (1958). On remand, the Ala-
bama court raised a new nonfederal ground not previously articulated and was again
reversed by the Supreme Court. Ex parte NAACP, 268 Ala. 531, 109 So. 2d 138
(1959), rev'd per curiam sub nor., NAACP v. Alabama, 360 U.S. 240 (1959).
Finally, the Supreme Court found it necessary to order a federal district court to
assume jurisdiction unless the NAACP was given a hearing on the merits in a state
court by a specified date. NAACP v. Gallion, 368 U.S. 16 (1961). There was evi-
dence, moreover, that the trial judge appeared on a Montgomery, Alabama, television
station as a candidate for reelection as Circuit Judge and said that he intended to
deal the NAACP and its local affiliate "a blow from which they will never recover."
Petition for Certiorari, Appendix B, p. 17a, instant case.
1 The insured paid $2.50 for the $62,500 coverage.
2The policy definition was as follows:
The words "Aircraft Operated by a Scheduled Air Carrier" . . . are defined
as follows: (1) aircraft of United States registry, operated on a regular,
special or chartered flight by a scheduled air carrier holding a certificate
of Public Convenience and Necessity issued by the Civil Aeronautics Board
of the United States of America, or its successor, and which in accordance
therewith files, prints, maintains and publishes schedules and tariffs for
regular passenger service between named cities at regular and specified times,
,,,,tor (3) aircraft of United States registry operated on a regular scheduled
flight solely within the boundaries of a State of the United States by a
scheduled air carrier legally authorized to conduct such operation, and which
files, prints, maintains and publishes schedules and tariffs for regular pas-
senger service between named cities solely within the boundaries of such
State at regular and specified times.
Instant case at 287-88 1.1, 27 Cal. Rptr. at 175-76 n.1.
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regular schedule, to fly the next lap of the trip.8 The crash of this sub-
stitute plane caused his death. The lower court relied on the exclusion
to deny the beneficiary recovery. The Supreme Court of California re-
versed in a four-to-three decision, holding that the nonscheduled carrier
exclusion was ambiguous as applied to substitute flights and must be con-
strued against the insurer. Steven v. Fidelity & Cas. Co., 377 P.2d 284,
27 Cal. Rptr. 172 (Sup. Ct.), reversing 204 Cal. App. 2d 54, 22 Cal. Rptr.
83 (Dist. Ct. App. 1962).
Insurance policy ambiguities are commonly construed against the in-
surer,4 who must establish lack of ambiguity.5  In order that reasonable
expectations of coverage will not be defeated, 6 courts interpret policies as
would an ordinary layman.7 They supposedly will not, however, adopt a
strained interpretation to give the insured the benefit of the ambiguity
rule.8 The common justification for these insured-favored rules is that
insurance contracts are "contracts of adhesion," 9 in which the insured has
virtually no bargaining power to affect the terms of the agreement.' 0
The court in the instant case found the nonscheduled carrier ex-
clusion ambiguous, although the air taxi held no CAB certificate and made
no regular flights between previously designated points as required in the
policy definition of "scheduled carrier." "1 The court noted that the
present case differs from previous decisions construing this exclusion
12
3 Thepolicy also required an exchange of tickets if flight plans were altered.
The court rejected the insurer's defense based on noncompliance with this clause
because the passenger's failure to comply did not increase the risk the insurer had
agreed to cover. Accord, Fidelity & Cas. Co. v. Smith, 189 F.2d 315 (10th Cir.
1951); Rosen v. Fidelity & Cas. Co., 162 F. Supp. 211 (E.D. Pa. 1958). But see
Tannebaum v. Continental Cas. Co., 28 Misc. 2d 860, 214 N.Y.S.2d 988 (Sup. Ct.
1961).
4 E.g., Rosen v. Fidelity & Cas. Co., 162 F. Supp. 211 (E.D. Pa. 1958) ; Freed-
man v. Queen Ins. Co. of America, 56 Cal. 2d 454, 364 P.2d 245, 15 Cal. Rptr. 69
(1961) ; Arenson v. National Auto. & Cas. Ins. Co., 45 Cal. 2d 81, 286 P.2d 816 (1955).
-Hoover v. Travelers Ins. Co., 173 Cal. App. 2d 361, 343 P.2d 385 (Dist. Ct.
App. 1959).
6Lagomarsino v. San Jose Abstract & Title Ins. Co., 178 Cal. App. 2d 455,
3 Cal. Rptr. 80 (Dist. Ct. App. 1960).7 E.g., Government Employees Ins. Co. v. Ziarno, 273 F.2d 645, 647 (2d Cir.
1960) ; Raulet v. Northwestern Nat'l Ins. Co., 157 Cal. 213, 107 Pac. 292 (1910).
8 See Blackburn v. Home Life Ins. Co., 19 Cal. 2d 226, 120 P.2d 31 (1941);
Lundquist v. Illinois Life & Acc. Ins. Co., 24 Ill. App. 2d 316, 164 N.E.2d 293 (1960).
9 See Ehrenzweig, Adhesion Contracts in the Conflict of Laws, 53 COLUm. L.
REv. 1072, 1075 (1953).
10 See Kessler, Contracts of Adhesion--Some Thoughts About Freedom of Con-
tract, 43 CoLum. L. RFv. 629, 632 (1943) ; Llewellyn, Book Review, 52 HARv. L. REv.
700, 704 (1939); Patterson, The Delivery of a Life-Insurance Policy, 33 HARV. L.
REv. 198 (1919); Radin, Contract Obligation and the Human Will, 43 CoLum. L. Rxv.
575 (1943); Shuchman, Consumer Credit by Adhesion Contracts, 35 TEI'. L.Q. 125,
129 (1962); Note, 24 U. Cm. L. REv. 315 (1957) ; Note, 70 YALE L.. 453 (1961).
For application of the adhesion doctrine in noninsurance contexts see, e.g., Los
Angeles Investment Co. v. Home Sav. Bank, 180 Cal. 601, 182 Pac. 293 (1919);
Henningsen v. Bloomfield Motors, Inc., 32 N.J. 358, 161 A.2d 69 (1960) ; Note, The
Form 50 Lease: Judicial Treatment of an Adhesion Contract, 111 U. PA. L. Rxv.
1197 (1963).
11 See note 2 supra.
12 Two other state courts have disagreed with each other on whether similar
definitions of "scheduled carriers" were ambiguous, but the circumstances of the
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because the insured's use of a nonscheduled carrier was substitute
emergency transportation incidental to his main, scheduled flight.13 The
court seems justified in finding ambiguous the application of the exclusion
to such a substitute flight.'4 Significantly, the only clause in the policy
relating to substitute transportation extended coverage to land trans-
portation arranged by the carrier to continue an interrupted passage.
There was no specific provision regarding substitute air transportation, 15
although the insurance company undoubtedly intended the general exclu-
sion to apply to substitute air flights. The court rejected the contention
that explicit mention of substitute land transportation impliedly excluded
all other substitutes. The company's knowledge that the insured will not
have time to scrutinize implied limitations in the brief moments before
departure 16 supports the finding that the insured could not be expected to
relate a general exclusion to substitute flights. Moreover, a reasonable
purchaser would probably expect that once he has bought a ticket on a
scheduled carrier his insurance would apply to substitute transportation for
the same flight.
1'
The court's concentration on ambiguity in the policy will at least force
insurers expressly to apply the non-scheduled carrier exclusion to the
substitute transportation clause, but its use of considerations applicable in
ordinary insurance litigation does not squarely face the unique problems
of machine-dispensed insurance. Clarification of the ambiguity is of little
benefit if the prospective purchaser cannot even inspect the policy before
he pays his premium. Machines are now in use which permit such in-
machine sale in those cases tended to produce different expectations of coverage and
may explain the different results. In Lachs v. Fidelity & Cas. Co., 306 N.Y. 357,
118 N.E.2d 555 (1954), the court held the insurer liable when the machine advertised
"Airline Trip Insurance" and was placed next to the counter which sold tickets for
nonscheduled flights. In Thompson v. Fidelity & Cas. Co., 16 Ill. App. 2d 159, 148
N.E.2d 9, cert. denied, 358 U.S. 837 (1958), however, the court found no ambiguity
in the nonscheduled carrier exclusion when the machine advertised coverage on
"Scheduled Airlines" and was not placed in a deceptive position. See also McBride v.
Prudential Ins. Co. of America, 147 Ohio St. 461, 72 N.E.2d 98 (1947).
Il Instant case at 290 n.5, 27 Cal. Rptr. at 178 n.5.
14 The court was less convincing in finding an ambiguity in the non-scheduled
carrier definition itself. It held that since the CAB regulations comprehended classes
of carriers other than scheduled and nonscheduled, and since the air taxi met neither
the CAB category for scheduled carriers nor its test for nonscheduled planes, the
policy failed explicitly to include or exclude the air taxi. Instant case at 290-92, 27
Cal. Rptr. at 178-80. Assuming the validity of this construction of the CAB regu-
lations, this ambiguity is hardly one which would mislead a typical purchaser of
insurance. See text accompanying note 7 mtpra. The court thus appears to have
violated its rule by adopting a strained interpretation in order to find an additional
ambiguity on which the insured could recover. See text accompanying note 8 supra.
This clause would not appear necessarily ambiguous in ordinary life policies
since the sale is made by an agent who can inform the insured of the meaning of
these provisions. Explicit reference to substitute air transportation might, however,
be necessary. For problems raised by this clause in such policies see, e.g., Grimes
v. New York Life Ins. Co., 84 F. Supp. 989 (E.D. Pa. 1949); Quinones v. Life &
Cas. Ins. Co., 209 La. 76, 24 So. 2d 270 (1945).
15 Instant case at 289, 27 Cal. Rptr. at 177.
16 The company's suggestion that the insured promptly mail the policy to his
beneficiary reduces even further this limited interval.
17 See instant case at 288-89, 27 Cal. Rptr. at 176-77.
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spection; these machines either have a specimen policy outside the machine
or provide policies which are validated by insertion into the machine.1 8
Whether or not many purchasers actually read their policies, it seems
inexcusable to prevent those who would from doing so prior to purchase.
However, although the opinion adverted 19 to the insured's inability to read
the policy, and this was an implicit factor in the court's finding of ambi-
guity, the court apparently was unwilling to rest its decision on that
ground.
Even if the insured has an opportunity to read the policy before pur-
chasing it, the insured has no opportunity to read machine-sold policies at
leisure, nor to discuss intricacies with an insurance agent. Courts could
provide full protection in this situation by requiring that insurance com-
panies place on machines a clear, nontechnical synopsis of the coverage
and limitations of the policy involved, which could easily be read by the
hurried traveler. Such notice of the nonscheduled carrier and clarified
substitute transportation provisions would protect passengers from buying
policies that do not cover their flights.20 By explicitly requiring prominent
notice of limitations, the court might better have confronted the problems
raised by the mechanized sale of insurance policies than by its emphasis on
ambiguities of the policy, which will not necessarily force insurers to give
reasonable notice.21
LIMITATION OF ACTIONS-Two STATE SUPREME CoURTS
DIVIDE ON WHETHER PLAITIFF MAY AMEND COMPLAINT To ALTER
CATEGORIZATION OF DEFENDANT'S BUSINEss ASSOcIATION AFTER
Time LIMIT For BRINGING SUIT
In a tort action brought thirteen days before the statute of limitations
barred suit, plaintiff named as defendant George Bennett, "an individual
doing business as Lakeside Enterprises." At trial plaintiff discovered that,
although the individual defendant and his wife owned the land used by
Lakeside, the concession itself was operated by the George Bennett Con-
18 The machine which provides policies on the outside for insertion also permits
a prudent person to carry an extra policy for his inspection when such questions as
substituted transportation arise.
19 Instant case at 293-94, 27 Cal. Rptr. at 181-82.
20 Had the present court rested its decision on the notice issue it would probably
have been forced to remand the case to determine the exact notice afforded, since
it was unclear whether the large type announcing the nonscheduled carrier exclusion
could be read through a display window. An alternate course might have placed on
the insurer the burden of showing that the machine reasonably informed the insured
of the important limitations of liability, and presumed inadequate notice in the absence
of such proof. The insured, however, should still have the burden of establishing
such positive circumstances of unfairness as existed in Lachs v. Fidelity & Cas. Co.,
306 N.Y. 357, 118 N.E.2d 555 (1954); see note 12 .rpra.
21 The court did, however, warn insurers that if they deal "with the public upon
a mass basis, the notice of noncoverage of the policy, in a situation in which the
public may reasonably expect coverage, must be conspicuous, plain and clear." Instant
case at 294, 27 Cal. Rptr. at 182.
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struction Company, a corporation.' The construction company, founded
by George Bennett its president,2 had been organized for several years, but
was not incorporated until twenty-eight days before the accident. No
notice was given the public that operation of Lakeside Enterprises had been
assumed by the corporation 4 Although the trial court allowed plaintiff
to substitute the corporate for the individual defendant, the Supreme Court
of Kansas reversed, holding that the amendment was barred by the statute
of limitations. Wyckoff v. Bennett, 380 P.2d 332 (Kan. 1963).
In another tort action the complaint named "Ellis Sutliff and Leo E.
Sutliff, individually and as partners, t/d/b/a Sutliff Chevrolet Company,"
and Leo E. Sutliff was personally served. After the running of the statute
of limitations, plaintiff discovered that Sutliff Chevrolet Company had been
incorporated, and sought to substitute the corporation in the complaint for
the originally named defendants. The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania,
Chief Justice Bell dissenting, reversed the trial court's refusal to amend,
holding that the amendment did not introduce a new party into the action,
but merely corrected an erroneous designation of the defendant. The court
emphasized that this substitution did not subject to liability different or
additional assets. Powell v. Sutliff, 410 Pa. 436, 189 A.2d 864 (1963).
Although the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania has allowed correction
after the statutory time limit of an inadvertent misnomer of a party who
was served and appeared before the court,5 its decisions, as well as those
of Kansas, have been less permissive when the amendment sought to change
an incorrect categorization of the defendant's form of business association.
In the past, many courts tended to prohibit all such amendments as intro-
ducing a new party and therefore a barred cause of action,6 but the more
1 At the first pretrial conference, held shortly after the statute of limitations had
run, the defendant's lawyer, when asked whether George Bennett operated Lakeside
Enterprises, answered, "I'm not in a position to admit or deny it now." This answer
indicates either that the defendant's lawyer was unprepared, that he was intentionally
misleading the plaintiff, or that the recent incorporation of the George Bennett Con-
struction Company was still in such a state of flux as to make the defendant's lawyer
unsure of its legal situation. In any case, the answer did not aid and could have
affirmatively misled the plaintiff. Wyckoff v. Bennett, 380 P.2d 332, 333 (Kan. 1963).
2 The percentage of the company's stock retained by George Bennett is not stated
in the record, the briefs of counsel, nor the court's opinion.
3 Bennett organized the company many years earlier to engage in highway and
bridge construction. His development of Lakeside Enterprises as an amusement park
was initially a separate operation which he carried on in his own name. Twenty-
eight days before the accident he incorporated the construction company and allegedly
turned over operation of the concession to it, authough no mention of such intention
appears in the Articles of Incorporation. Letter From Stephen J. Dolinar, Counsel
for Appellee, to the University of Pennsylvania Law Review, August 15, 1963. See
Counter-Abstract of Record, Wyckoff v. Bennett, 380 P.2d 332 (Kan. 1963).
4 See Brief for Appellee, p. 27, Wyckoff v. Bennett, supra note 3. The only
evidence other than Bennett's testimony that the corporation operated Lakeside con-
sisted of canceled checks drawn on the corporation for operating expenses. Wyckoff
v. Bennett, 380 P.2d 334 (Kan. 1963).
5 Waugh v. Steelton Taxicab Co., 371 Pa. 436, 89 A.2d 527 (1952) ; cf. Sundgren
v. Topeka Transp. Co., 178 Kan. 83, 283 P.2d 444 (1955) (amending name of plaintiff
after running of statute).
6 See, e.g., Challis v. Hartloff, 133 Kan. 221, 299 Pac. 586 (1931); Girardi v.
Laquin Lumber Co., 232 Pa. 1, 81 Atl. 63 (1911) (per curiam). Compare Annot.,
8 A.L.R.2d 166 (1949).
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liberal view of pleading, exemplified by the Federal Rules of Civil Pro-
cedure, has prompted both federal and state courts to look instead to the
purposes of the statute of limitations in reaching their decisions.7
Statutes of limitations are designed to give security to the defendant
after a lapse of time and to protect him from the dangers of litigating when
witnesses and evidence have passed from his control.8 The security
rationale is obviously inapplicable if the alleged wrongdoer has notice of
the plaintiff's claim within the statutory period In addition, if he had
reason to know that the plaintiff intended to sue him, it is fair to
require the defendant to secure witnesses and preserve evidence, rather
than hope that the plaintiff will not discover his error until the statute
totally bars his claim. This burden seems properly placed upon the
defendant rather than the plaintiff, since the defendant usually has full
knowledge of the situation.
Many of the criteria used by the courts to determine the propriety of
substituting a new defendant after the statute of limitations has run reflect
this "notice" consideration. They have asked whether the new defendant
was adequately served with notice of the proceedings before the running
of the statute; 10 whether, in the case of a corporate defendant, the defend-
ant might have been confused as to whom the plaintiff intended to sue
because of the existence of two separate businesses operating under sub-
stantially identical names; -' whether the defendant was actually repre-
sented in court; 12 and whether it actively participated in the defense.13
7 Cabot v. Clearwater Constr. Co., 89 So. 2d 662 (Fla. 1956) ; ef. Tiller v. Atlantic
Coast Line R.R., 323 U.S. 574, 581 (1945) (Black, J.).
8 FRANKS, LImrrATIox OF AcTiONs 4-5 (1959); Developments in the Law--
Statutes of Limitations, 63 HAgv. L. REv. 1177, 1185 (1950) ; Note, Code Pleading:
Amendment After the Limitations Period in Oklahoma, 7 OYA. L. REv. 82, 83 (1954).
A third reason, of somewhat less importance, is the desire to save the courts from
the necessity of litigating "stale" claims when current cases demand decision. The
validity of this argument has been challenged, however. See CHADBOuRu & LEVIN,
CASES ON CIVIL PRocEnuRE 207 (1961).
9 "[W]hen a defendant has had notice from the beginning that the plaintiff sets
up and is trying to enforce a claim against it because of specified conduct, the reasons
for the statute of limitations do not exist .... " New York Cent R.R. v. Kinney,
260 U.S. 340, 346 (1922) (Holmes, J.).
10 Williams v. Stoudt & Son, 9 Pa. D. & C.2d 786 (C.P. Lehigh County 1956),
aff'd, 404 Pa. 377, 172 A.2d 278 (1961); Waugh v. Steelton Taxicab Co., 371 Pa.
436, 437, 89 A.2d 527, 528 (1952). See generally BARRON & HoLTZoFF, FEDERAL
PRACcICE AND PLEADING 766 (1960) (criteria under FED. R. CiV. P.).
11 See McGinnis v. Valvoline Oil Works, 251 Pa. 407, 96 At. 1038 (1916) ; Dress
v. Schuylkill Ry., 83 Pa. Super. 149 (1924) ; Developments in the Law--Statutes of
Limitations, 63 HARv. L. RE. 1177, 1241 (1950).
12 "A party whose name it is asked to amend must be in court." White Co. v.
Fayette Auto Co., 43 Pa. Super. 532, 533 (1910) ; see Adams v. Beland Realty Corp.,
187 F. Supp. 680, 681 (E.D.N.Y. 1960) ; Sumner v. j & J Coal & Trucking Co., 55
Pa. D. & C. 41, 43 (C.P. Monroe County 1945); Williams v. Dean Phipps Auto
Stores, Inc., 41 Pa. D. & C. 430, 435 (C.P. Fayette County 1941). It is possible,
however, that a party not in court has nevertheless received adequate notice of the
action.
13 Adams v. Beland Realty Corp., supra note 12; cf. Heath v. Martin, 187 Kan.
733, 740, 359 P.2d 865, 871 (1961).
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Some courts have also inquired whether the new defendant is, in fact, the
same "business entity" as that originally named; 14 whether as a result of
the amendment defendant would be required to offer additional evidence; 15
and whether different damages might be sought,1 6 or separate assets become
liable to seizure.'
7
Although the use of the "assets" criterion led the Pennsylvania court
to a just result in Powell,18 this test only indirectly and perhaps inaccurately
reflects the purposes of the statute of limitations.'9 The court might have
better rested its decision on the service of process which effectively gave the
corporation notice of the plaintiff's claim within the statutory period.20 The
similarity between the names of the original and substituted defendants
and the nonexistence of any business entity as that originally named 2l
negate any contention that the corporation did not have full knowledge of
the existence and nature of the plaintiff's claim.
These considerations indicate that the amendment should have been
allowed by the Kansas court in Wyckoff. George Bennett had been presi-
dent of the George Bennett Construction Company since its inception, and
service upon Bennett afforded this corporation full knowledge that the
plaintiff was attempting "to enforce a claim against it because of specified
1
4 Waugh v. Steelton Taxicab Co., 371 Pa. 436, 440, 89 A.2d 527, 529 (1952);
Gozdonovic v. Pleasant Hills Realty Co., 357 Pa. 23, 29, 53 A.2d 73, 76 (1947).
15 Porter v. Theo. J. Ely Mfg. Co., 5 F.R.D. 317, 321 (W.D. Pa. 1946) ; Boyd v.
Rager, 9 Pa. D. & C.2d 660, 669 (C.P. Mercer County 1956).
16 Ibid.
17 Gozdonovic v. Pleasant Hills Realty Co., 357 Pa. 23, 29, 53 A.2d 73, 76 (1947).
18 While the decision of the court in the present case seems correct, dictum of
the court in a footnote, 410 Pa. at 439 n.6, 189 A.2d at 865 n.6, giving a blanket
affirmance to three previous cases, two of which refused to allow amendment, may be
misleading because it failed to look to the purposes of the statutes of limitation. The
decision in Girardi v. Laquin Lumber Co., 232 Pa. 1, 81 Atl. 63 (1911) is a per
curiam affirmance of the rule that a new party cannot be brought into an action after
the statute of limitations has run, and the opinion fails to deal with questions of notice
and representation. In Miller v. Jacobs, 361 Pa. 492, 65 A.2d 362 (1949), plaintiff
erred when she sued an estate instead of the administrator for a tort committed by
the administrator while acting in his official capacity. It is a questionable decision
because the administrator received ample notice. The decision in Waugh v. Steelton
Taxicab Co., 371 Pa. 436, 89 A.2d 527 (1952), allowing an amendment, is difficult
to distinguish factually from Girardi, except that the former involved the substitution
of an individual for a corporation, while the latter involved the substitution of a
partnership for a corporation. In both cases the originally named defendant was
nonexistent, and the title of the business asociation involved helped cause the plaintiff's
mistake; in neither did the defendant intentionally cause this error, nor was he in
doubt as to whom the plaintiff actually intended to sue. Although the present court
distinguished Waugh because it involved a risk that defendant deceived plaintiff, this
risk seems equally significant in Girardi. Yet the court in Waugh allowed the amend-
ment without mentioning Girardi.
19Future Pennsylvania decisions will have to define further the "assets" test.
It is unclear at the present whether the court is referring to the total assets of the
business association sought to be sued or to the assets of the originally named de-
fendants. If it is the latter, the courts may be forced to harsh results in a Powell
situation when a party not originally sued has contributed to the corporation's assets.
20 The presence in court of persons legally empowered to represent the corporation
also supports the conclusion that the corporation had notice of the claim. Adequate
notice is clearly possible, however, although the party sought to be substituted is not
represented in court.
21 Brief for Appellant, p. 8, Powell v. Sutliff, 410 Pa. 436, 189 A.2d 864 (1963).
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conduct." 2 2 The same firm of lawyers represented Bennett and his cor-
poration.23 There was no contention that different assets might be involved
in an action against the corporate, as opposed to the individual, defendant,
or that different proof would be required. Bennett himself could hardly
have been confused as to whom the plaintiff intended to sue. If the court
felt that the corporation, with such adequate notice, still needed additional
time to prepare its defense, a continuance rather than a dismissal would
seem proper. Neither lack of notice to the corporation, inexcusable negli-
gence on the part of the plaintiff, nor the purposes of the statute of limita-
tions justifies the harsh result reached by this court.24
In two jurisdictions in which the courts were unwilling to avoid such
results, the legislatures enacted so-called "safety-net" provisions? 5 Other
jurisdictions should consider legislation to permit an action against a party
not originally named defendant, even though the statute has run, if the
original action was brought within the statutory period, the failure to join
the new defendant was the result of "excusable ignorance," 2  service of
process was obtained on a person empowered to accept summons for the
new defendant within the statutory period, such person knew or had reason
to know that the plaintiff intended to sue his principal rather than himself,
27
and the claim in both the original and the amended pleadings arose from
the same transaction or occurrence2 8 These provisions recognize the goals
of the statute of limitations, but avoid the defeat of meritorious claims.
However, this result may be reached with equal propriety by judicial deci-
sion,2 and courts faced with this question should look to the goals of the
statute of limitations, rather than a mechanical formula, before prohibiting
the requested amendment.
22 New York Cent. R.R. v. Kinsey, 260 U.S. 340, 346 (1922) (Holmes, J.).
23 Brief of Appellee, p. 9, Wyckoff v. Bennett, 191 Kan. 180, 380 P.2d 332 (1963).
24 This case reflects the previous Kansas approach although it is distinguishable
on its facts from previous decisions. See Challis v. Hartloff, 133 Kan. 221, 299 Pac.
586 (1931) ; Garrity v. Board of Administration, 99 Kan. 695, 162 Pac. 1167 (1917).
As late as 1959 the Kansas Supreme Court in Logan-Moore Lumber Co. v. Black,
185 Kan. 644, 651, 347 P.2d 438, 444 (1959), stated that, "It is clear that a pleading,
though filed in time against one party . . . cannot be amended after the expiration
of the statute of limitations to name another party as defendant"
25 See ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 110, § 46 (Smith-Hurd 1956), CoNN. G-N. STAT. ANN.
§ 52-593 (1960).
28 The use of the word "inadvertent; in the Illinois statute on which this statute
is based has led to some confusion, see Robinson v. Chicago Nat'1 Bank, 32 Ill. App.
2d 55, 176 N.E.2d 659 (1961), and the suggested legislation attempts to define this
condition more specifically.
2 7 See Sanders v. Metzger, 66 F. Supp. 262 (E.D. Pa. 1946).
28 Section 46(4) (d) of the Illinois statute, ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 110, § 46 (Smith-
Hurd 1956), requires that the defendant now sought to be charged "knew that the
original action was pending and that it grew out of a transaction or occurrence in-
volving or concerning him . . . ." If service of process was obtained upon an agent
of the new defendant, and if such agent should have known that such service was
intended for his principal but failed to inform him thereof, this additional requirement
of knowledge would seem to place too great a burden on the plaintiff in an area over
which he has no control.
29 See Cabot v. Clearwater Constr. Co., 89 So. 2d 662 (Fla. 1956) ; O'Quinn v.
Scott, 251 S.W.2d 168 (Tex. Ct. Civ. App. 1952).
